2020

No intervalo [0, 2π], a soma de todas as soluções de

A tabela apresenta algumas substâncias químicas muito utilizadas em nosso cotidiano.

Diversos polímeros, como o polietileno, o teflon e o PVC, são produzidos pelo mesmo tipo de reação de polimerização. Esses polímeros são empregados na fabricação de embalagens e em diversas finalidades em en genharia. A fórmula estrutural de um polímero reciclável dessa classe está representada a seguir.

Entre os diversos defensivos químicos empregados na agricultura estão o Malathion® e o florpirauxifen-benzil. Suas fórmulas estruturais estão representadas a seguir.

Entre os diversos defensivos químicos empregados na agricultura estão o Malathion® e o florpirauxifen-benzil. Suas fórmulas estruturais estão representadas a seguir.

Em outubro de 2017 diversos países europeus reportaram detecções da presença anormal do radiosótopo rutênio-106 (¹⁰⁶Ru) no ar atmosférico. Esse fato foi atribuído a um acidente nuclear que ocorreu na Rússia. A radioatividade referente a esse radioisótopo, medida na atmosfera, foi de 100 mBq/m³. O radioisótopo rutênio-106 decai com emissão de partículas β– com tempo de meia-vida igual a 1 ano.

Uma cozinheira preparou um molho de tomate para ser consumido posteriormente, armazenando-o no refrigerador, em um recipiente de aço inoxidável coberto com uma folha de alumínio, conforme mostram as imagens.

O composto digluconato de clorexidina (DGC) possui massa molar igual a 505,5 g/mol e é o princípio ativo em soluções destinadas à assepsia e esterilização das mãos em procedimentos cirúrgicos. Uma solução alcoólica comercial desse composto contém 0,5% em massa de DGC e sua densidade é igual a 1,0 g/mL.

A furaltadona (C₁₃H₁₆N₄O₆) é uma substância bactericida empregada no combate à salmonela, sendo adicionada à água de bebedouros em criadouros de aves. A furaltadona interage com a água de acordo com a reação representada pela equação:

O ânion hidreto (H^–) forma o hidreto de sódio (NaH), composto empregado no estudo do mecanismo de reações químicas, por ser um forte agente redutor. O íon hidreto reage violentamente com a água, formando o gás hidrogênio (H₂), como representa a equação da reação:

Granadas de fumaça são dispositivos usados pelas forças armadas em situações de combate, com o objetivo de ocultar a movimentação das tropas. Nesses dispositivos, os reagentes hexacloroetano (C₂Cl ₆), alumínio em pó (Al) e óxido de zinco (ZnO) ficam em compartimentos separados e, quando o detonador é acionado, ocorre a mistura desses reagentes, provocando uma sequência de duas reações instantâneas, representadas pelas seguintes equações:

Granadas de fumaça são dispositivos usados pelas forças armadas em situações de combate, com o objetivo de ocultar a movimentação das tropas. Nesses dispositivos, os reagentes hexacloroetano (C₂Cl ₆), alumínio em pó (Al) e óxido de zinco (ZnO) ficam em compartimentos separados e, quando o detonador é acionado, ocorre a mistura desses reagentes, provocando uma sequência de duas reações instantâneas, representadas pelas seguintes equações:

O Bioglass® é um vidro que apresenta a característica de se ligar fortemente ao tecido ósseo e, devido a essa propriedade, é muito empregado em implantes.
Esse material é sintetizado a partir dos seguintes óxidos: dióxido de silício, óxido de cálcio, óxido de sódio e pentóxido de difósforo.

Um experimento para a identificação de um metal M foi realizado de acordo com a montagem instrumental da figura.

A argentita é um minério de prata no qual o cátion monovalente do metal nobre encontra-se ligado ao ânion sulfeto.

As curvas apresentadas no gráfico foram construídas com dados obtidos em uma pesquisa experimental que monitorou o comportamento da pressão de vapor dos líquidos 1, 2, 3 e 4 em função da temperatura.

De acordo com a teoria da relatividade de Einstein, a conversão de massa em energia é regida pela expressão E = m . c², sendo c a velocidade da luz no vácuo, que é igual a 3 × 10⁸ m/s. No interior do Sol, ocorrem fusões nas quais quatro átomos de hidrogênio se unem para formar um átomo de hélio. A massa dos quatro átomos de hidrogênio é ligeiramente maior que a de um átomo de hélio, e essa diferença, que é de aproximadamente 5,0 × 10^–29 kg, é convertida em energia.

Uma espira quadrada ABCD, de lado d, move-se no plano xy, paralelamente ao eixo x, inicialmente com velocidade constante v₀. Em dado instante, a espira entra em uma região em que existe um campo magnético uniforme, com direção perpendicular ao plano xy e sentido saindo do papel.

O esquema representa um circuito elétrico composto por uma bateria ideal de força eletromotriz ε e três pequenas lâmpadas incandescentes idênticas.

A figura mostra dois instantes das configurações extremas de uma corda na qual se estabeleceu uma onda estacionária. As ondas que originam a onda estacionária têm comprimento igual a 40 cm e se propagam na corda com velocidade de 200 cm/s.

A figura mostra um raio de luz monocromática que incide na face AC de um prisma de vidro que se encontra mergulhado na água. A direção do raio incidente é perpendicular à face BC do prisma.

Um objeto realiza movimento harmônico simples, de amplitude A e frequência f, em frente a um espelho esférico convexo, deslocando-se sobre o eixo principal do espelho.

Analise o gráfico, que apresenta a variação da pressão atmosférica terrestre em função da altitude.

O calor pode se propagar por meio de três processos, condução, convecção e radiação, embora existam situações em que as condições do ambiente impedem a ocorrência de alguns deles.

A figura mostra o mesmo bloco deslizando sobre duas rampas. A primeira está inclinada de um ângulo 0₁ em relação à horizontal e a segunda está inclinada de um ângulo 0₂, também em relação à horizontal, sendo 0₁ menor que 0₂

Um barquinho de brinquedo, contendo no seu interior uma bolinha de gude de massa m, flutua na água de um recipiente, graduado em unidades de volume.

Uma criança de massa 40 kg estava em pé no centro de uma prancha plana, de massa 12 kg, que flutuava em repouso na superfície da água de uma piscina. Em certo instante, a criança saltou, na direção do comprimento da prancha, com velocidade horizontal constante de 0,6 m/s em relação ao solo, ficou no ar por 1,0 s e caiu na piscina a 1,7 m da extremidade da prancha.

No dia 10 de junho de 1969 foi lançada a nave espacial Apollo, que transportou os primeiros homens a pousarem na Lua.

Durante uma competição, um atleta lançou um disco numa direção que formava um ângulo com a horizontal. Esse disco permaneceu no ar por 4,0 segundos e atingiu o solo a 60 m do ponto de lançamento.

Dois amigos, Marcos e Pedro, estão às margens de um lago, no ponto A, e decidem nadar até um barco, que se encontra no ponto C. Marcos supõe que chegará mais rápido se nadar direto do ponto A até o ponto C, enquanto Pedro supõe que seria mais rápido correr até o ponto B, que está sobre uma reta que contém o ponto C e é perpendicular à margem, e depois nadar até o barco.

A tabela mostra os valores das pressões que devem ser utilizadas nos pneus de um automóvel, em unidades que não pertencem ao Sistema Internacional de Unidades (SI).

O gráfico da função real f(x) = √1 + mx²

A figura indica uma circunferência de equação x² + y² –10x – 10y + 45 = 0, com centro em C e diâmetro PQ, no plano cartesiano de eixos ortogonais. As retas r e s se intersectam no ponto B e tangenciam a circunferência nos pontos P e T. A medida do ângulo PBT é igual a α radianos.

Um quadrado de dimensões microscópicas tem área igual a 1,6 × 10^–10 m². Sendo log 2 = m e log 5 = n, a medida do lado desse quadrado, em metro,

As bandeiras dos cinco países do Mercosul serão hasteadas em dois postes, um verde e um amarelo. As cinco bandeiras devem ser hasteadas e cada poste deve ter pelo menos uma bandeira. Constituem situações diferentes de hasteamento a troca de ordem das bandeiras em um mesmo poste e a troca das cores dos mastros associadas a cada configuração.

Ana, Bia, Cléo, Dani, Érica e Fabi se sentam ao redor de uma mesa circular, como se estivessem nos vértices de um hexágono regular inscrito na circunferência da mesa. A respeito de suas posições, sabe-se que:
• Bia está imediatamente ao lado de Cléo e diametralmente oposta a Ana;
• Dani não está sentada imediatamente ao lado de Ana.

Sendo x um número real, o operador X é igual aEsse operador também admite composições como, por exemplo, -1 = 5. De acordo com a definição do operador, o valor de

A figura indica o triângulo FGV, no plano cartesiano de eixos ortogonais, e as coordenadas dos seus vértices.

Considere a matriz quadrada A = (a^ij)^2×2, com

A soma das duas raízes não reais da equação algébrica x³ + 2x² + 3x + 2 = 0, resolvida em C,

Admita que uma notícia, consultada na internet, tenha vindo com um X no lugar de um gráfico, como indica a imagem a seguir

Sendo m e n números reais não nulos, um dos fatores do polinômio P(x) = mx² – nx + m é (3x – 2).

Seja FGV um triângulo isósceles, desenhado no plano cartesiano de eixos ortogonais, com FG = GV = 5 e FV = 6, vértice F coincidindo com a origem dos eixos, FV contido no eixo x e ângulos internos, em radianos, como mostra a figura 1.

Uma urna contém 11 fichas idênticas, marcadas com os números 2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 5, 6, 7, 8 e 9. Retiram-se ao acaso duas fichas e denota-se o produto dos números obtidos por P. Em seguida, sem reposição, retira-se ao acaso mais uma ficha e denota-se o número obtido por N.

O valor máximo da função real dada por

A figura indica os gráficos das funções reais definidas por y = –1 + 2cos (2x) e y + 1 + √3 = 0 no plano cartesiano de eixos ortogonais, sendo P um dos pontos de intersecção dos gráficos.

Sendo k um número real, o conjunto de todos os valores reais de k para os quais o sistema de equações

A figura indica um cone reto de revolução de vértice V, altura VC e diâmetro da base AB. O ponto M pertence à geratriz VP do cone, AMB é um triângulo de área igual a 3√3 cm², VC = BM, CM = CA = CB = MV = MP e o ângulo A ^{^} MB é reto.

ABCD e A'B'C'D' são faces de dois paralelepípedos retoretangulares que estão encostados de forma que duas arestas do menor estão totalmente contidas em duas arestas do maior, como mostra a figura.Além das medidas indicadas na figura, sabe-se que:
• P e Q pertencem a CD e A’B’, respectivamente;
• PQ é perpendicular a A’B’;
• RCB’C’ e RPQC’ são retângulos.

Em certo dia, a cotação da libra esterlina em Nova Iorque era de 1,25 dólar americano por 1,00 libra, e a cotação de 1,00 dólar americano era de 4,10 reais. Nesse mesmo dia, em Londres, 1,00 libra era cotada a 5,09 reais e 1 dólar americano era cotado a 4,15 reais. Bianca e Carolina compraram, nesse mesmo dia, 415 libras cada uma.

Com a finalidade de fazer uma reserva financeira para usar daqui a 10 anos, Luís planejou o seguinte investimento: depositar no mês 1 a quantia de R$ 500,00 e, em cada mês subsequente, depositar uma quantia 0,4% superior ao depósito do mês anterior, em uma aplicação financeira que rende 0,5% ao mês, capitalizado mensalmente.

Para que o preço atual de um produto ficasse igual ao preço dele 5 anos atrás, seria necessário dar um desconto de 60%. Sabendo-se que a média entre o preço atual desse produto e o preço praticado há 5 anos é igual a R$ 168,00,

Um polígono regular de x lados está perfeitamente cercado por polígonos regulares idênticos de y lados, sem sobreposições ou espaços livres. Por exemplo, a figura mostra a situação descrita para o caso em que x = 4 e y = 8.

Considere a equação 10z² – 2iz – k = 0, em que z é um número complexo e i² = –1.

Uma moeda não honesta tem probabilidade igual a 2/3 de sair cara, contra 1/3 de sair coroa. Lançando-se essa moeda 20 vezes,

Na figura, FECO é um trapézio isósceles, com FE = OC = 5 cm, EC = 4 cm e FO = 10 cm, e FGV é um triângulo retângulo com ângulo reto em V, com C em FG e O em FV.

Uma urna contém 2/3 de bolas brancas e 1/3 de bolas pretas, sendo que somente metade das bolas brancas e 2/3 das bolas pretas contêm um prêmio em seu interior. Uma bola dessa urna é sorteada aleatoriamente e, quando aberta, verifica-se que tem um prêmio no seu interior.

Uma amostra de cinco número inteiros não negativos, que pode apresentar números repetidos, possui média igual a 10 e mediana igual a 12.

Atualmente, o preço de uma mercadoria é 20% superior ao que era há um ano. Sabe-se também que o preço atual é 10% superior ao preço da mercadoria na época em que ela custava R$ 100,00 a menos do que hoje.

Uma formiga desloca-se sobre uma malha quadriculada com eixos cartesianos ortogonais. Ela parte do ponto de coordenadas (0, 0) e segue um caminho conforme o padrão indicado na figura.

A figura indica uma configuração retangular feita com palitos idênticos.

O planeta que está ficando cada vez mais desigual. Nos últimos 40 anos, a concentração de renda só cresceu com a globalização. Tanto é assim que atualmente nenhum país tem maior desigualdade que a África do Sul. O país, por ironia, viu crescer a desigualdade após o fim do Apartheid.

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Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

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Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

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Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

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Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

Leia a tira Níquel Náusea, de Fernando Gonsales.

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Nos dois primeiros episódios da série Chernobyl, da HBO, cientistas exasperados tentam convencer os superiores na usina e no governo soviético de que um dos reatores nucleares explodiu e está jorrando radioatividade sobre a Europa.
A resposta dos superiores, exemplar da estupidez surrealista de uma burocracia totalitária, é sempre a mesma: impossível, um “reator RBMK não explode”. A posição oficial é que havia somente um pequeno incêndio no telhado.
“Eu fui lá, eu vi!”, repetem os cientistas, um após o outro, antes de vomitarem, verterem sangue pelos poros ou caírem duros. Apenas quando a radioatividade é detectada na Suécia, Mikhail Gorbatchov encara seus ministros com uma expressão de “camarada, deu ruim...” — naquela altura, a radioatividade liberada já era superior à de vinte bombas de Hiroshima.
Só mesmo no totalitarismo soviético, pensei, assistindo à série. Então fui ler na revista Piauí o trecho do livro A Terra inabitável: uma história do futuro, do jornalista David Wallace-Wells, que sairá pela Companhia das Letras no mês que vem. Impossível terminar as 11 páginas sobre o aquecimento global sem ficar apavorado feito um cientista em Chernobyl.

(Antonio Prata. “Bem-vindos a Chernobyl”.
www.folha.uol.com.br, 16.06.2019. Adaptado.)

Leia o texto para responder

Nos dois primeiros episódios da série Chernobyl, da HBO, cientistas exasperados tentam convencer os superiores na usina e no governo soviético de que um dos reatores nucleares explodiu e está jorrando radioatividade sobre a Europa.
A resposta dos superiores, exemplar da estupidez surrealista de uma burocracia totalitária, é sempre a mesma: impossível, um “reator RBMK não explode”. A posição oficial é que havia somente um pequeno incêndio no telhado.
“Eu fui lá, eu vi!”, repetem os cientistas, um após o outro, antes de vomitarem, verterem sangue pelos poros ou caírem duros. Apenas quando a radioatividade é detectada na Suécia, Mikhail Gorbatchov encara seus ministros com uma expressão de “camarada, deu ruim...” — naquela altura, a radioatividade liberada já era superior à de vinte bombas de Hiroshima.
Só mesmo no totalitarismo soviético, pensei, assistindo à série. Então fui ler na revista Piauí o trecho do livro A Terra inabitável: uma história do futuro, do jornalista David Wallace-Wells, que sairá pela Companhia das Letras no mês que vem. Impossível terminar as 11 páginas sobre o aquecimento global sem ficar apavorado feito um cientista em Chernobyl.

(Antonio Prata. “Bem-vindos a Chernobyl”.
www.folha.uol.com.br, 16.06.2019. Adaptado.)

Leia o texto para responder

Nos dois primeiros episódios da série Chernobyl, da HBO, cientistas exasperados tentam convencer os superiores na usina e no governo soviético de que um dos reatores nucleares explodiu e está jorrando radioatividade sobre a Europa.
A resposta dos superiores, exemplar da estupidez surrealista de uma burocracia totalitária, é sempre a mesma: impossível, um “reator RBMK não explode”. A posição oficial é que havia somente um pequeno incêndio no telhado.
“Eu fui lá, eu vi!”, repetem os cientistas, um após o outro, antes de vomitarem, verterem sangue pelos poros ou caírem duros. Apenas quando a radioatividade é detectada na Suécia, Mikhail Gorbatchov encara seus ministros com uma expressão de “camarada, deu ruim...” — naquela altura, a radioatividade liberada já era superior à de vinte bombas de Hiroshima.
Só mesmo no totalitarismo soviético, pensei, assistindo à série. Então fui ler na revista Piauí o trecho do livro A Terra inabitável: uma história do futuro, do jornalista David Wallace-Wells, que sairá pela Companhia das Letras no mês que vem. Impossível terminar as 11 páginas sobre o aquecimento global sem ficar apavorado feito um cientista em Chernobyl.

(Antonio Prata. “Bem-vindos a Chernobyl”.
www.folha.uol.com.br, 16.06.2019. Adaptado.)

Leia um trecho da letra da canção “Amazônia”, de Roberto Carlos, para responder

Amazônia

A lei do machado
Avalanches de desatinos
Numa ambição desmedida
Absurdos contra os destinos
De tantas fontes de vida
Quanta falta de juízo
Tolices fatais
Quem desmata, mata
Não sabe o que faz
Como dormir e sonhar
Quando a fumaça no ar
Arde nos olhos de quem pode ver
Terríveis sinais, de alerta, desperta
Pra selva viver
Amazônia, insônia do mundo
Amazônia, insônia do mundo

(www.vagalume.com.br)

Leia um trecho da letra da canção “Amazônia”, de Roberto Carlos, para responder

Amazônia

A lei do machado
Avalanches de desatinos
Numa ambição desmedida
Absurdos contra os destinos
De tantas fontes de vida
Quanta falta de juízo
Tolices fatais
Quem desmata, mata
Não sabe o que faz
Como dormir e sonhar
Quando a fumaça no ar
Arde nos olhos de quem pode ver
Terríveis sinais, de alerta, desperta
Pra selva viver
Amazônia, insônia do mundo
Amazônia, insônia do mundo

(www.vagalume.com.br)

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São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

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São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

Leia o texto para responder

São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

Na organização das informações textuais, as expressões sublinhadas em “ A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas” (1.^o parágrafo) e “Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano” (4.^o parágrafo) têm, respectivamente, a função de:

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São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Um avião decola da cidade de Nova Iorque (75º O) em direção à cidade de Berlim (15º L) no dia 13.08.2019, às 14h00. O voo teve duração de 7 horas. Sabendo que os Estados Unidos e a Alemanha estavam no horário de verão, de março a outubro,

A imagem constitui o esboço de uma carta topográfica.

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O desmatamento de florestas tropicais

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