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Um restaurante francês oferece um prato sofisticado ao - FGV 2014

Matemática - 2024

Um restaurante francês oferece um prato sofisticado ao preço de p reais por unidade. A quantidade mensal x de pratos que é vendida relaciona-se com o preço cobrado através da função p = – 0,4x + 200.

Um triângulo ABC é retângulo em A . Sabendo que BC 5e 0 - FGV 2014

Matemática - 2024

Um triângulo ABC é retângulo em A. Sabendo que BC = 5 e A^ BC = 30°,

The title and the lead-in (in journalist jargon, the line - FGV 2015

Inglês - 2023

Read the text and answer the question

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky



Cristina Fernández argues that her country’s latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014
ARGENTINA’S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.
Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.
Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures” as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.
Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts’ orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina’s government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.
Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America’s court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.
Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.
More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina’s image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week’s events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else’s, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)

Um bloco de ferro maciço, de formato cilíndrico, é levado - FGV 2014

Física - 2023

Um bloco de ferro maciço, de formato cilíndrico, é levado com velocidade constante para o fundo de um tanque cheio de água, de profundidade maior que sua geratriz, como mostra a sequência de figuras.

Questão 100 - FGV 2014

In the sentence fragment from the last paragraph – it must - FGV 2014

Inglês - 2023

Read the article and answer the question

The road to hell

(1) Bringing crops from one of the futuristic new farms in Brazil’s central and northern plains to foreign markets means taking a journey back in time. Loaded onto lorries, most are driven almost 2,000km south on narrow, potholed roads to the ports of Santos and Paranaguá. In the 19th and early 20th centuries they were used to bring in immigrants and ship out the coffee grown in the fertile states of São Paulo and Paraná, but now they are overwhelmed. Thanks to a record harvest this year, Brazil became the world’s largest soya producer, overtaking the United States. The queue of lorries waiting to enter Santos sometimes stretched to 40km.

(2) No part of that journey makes sense. Brazil has too few crop silos, so lorries are used for storage as well as transport, causing a crush at ports after harvest. Produce from so far north should probably not be travelling to southern ports at all. Freight by road costs twice as much as by rail and four times as much as by water. Brazilian farmers pay 25% or more of the value of their soya to bring it to port; their competitors in Iowa just 9%. The bottleneck at ports pushes costs higher still. It also puts off customers. In March Sunrise Group, China’s biggest soya trader, cancelled an order for 2m tonnes of Brazilian soya after repeated delays.

(3) All of Brazil’s infrastructure is decrepit. The World Economic Forum ranks it at 114th out of 148 countries. After a spate of railway-building at the turn of the 20th century, and road- and dam-building 50 years later, little was added or even maintained. In the 1980s infrastructure was a casualty of slowing growth and spiralling inflation. Unable to find jobs, engineers emigrated or retrained. Government stopped planning for the long term. According to Contas Abertas, a public-spending watchdog, only a fifth of federal money budgeted for urban transport in the past decade was actually spent. Just 1.5% of Brazil’s GDP goes on infrastructure investment from all sources, both public and private. The long-run global average is 3.8%. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates the total value of Brazil’s infrastructure at 16% of GDP. Other big economies average 71%. To catch up, Brazil would have to triple its annual infrastructure spending for the next 20 years.

(4) Moreover, it may be getting poor value from what little it does invest because so much goes on the wrong things. A cumbersome environmental-licensing process pushes up costs and causes delays. Expensive studies are required before construction on big projects can start and then again at various stages along the way and at the end. Farmers and manufacturers spend heavily on lorries because road transport is their only option. But that is working around the problem, not solving it.

(5) In the 1990s Mr Cardoso’s government privatised state-owned oil, energy and telecoms firms. It allowed private operators to lease terminals in public ports and to build their own new ports. Imports were booming as the economy opened up, so container terminals were a priority. The one at the public port in Bahia’s capital, Salvador, is an example of the transformation wrought by private money and management. Its customers used to rate it Brazil’s worst port, with a draft too shallow for big ships and a quay so short that even smaller vessels had to unload a bit at a time. But in the past decade its operator, Wilson & Sons, spent 260m reais on replacing equipment, lengthening the quay and deepening the draft. Capacity has doubled. Land access will improve, too, once an almost finished expressway opens. Paranaguá is spending 400m reais from its own revenues on replacing outdated equipment, but without private money it cannot expand enough to end the queues to dock. It has drawn up detailed plans to build a new terminal and two new quays, and identified 20 dockside areas that could be leased to new operators, which would bring in 1.6 billion reais of private investment. All that is missing is the federal government’s permission. It hopes to get it next year, but there is no guarantee.

(6) Firms that want to build their own infrastructure, such as mining companies, which need dedicated railways and ports, can generally build at will in Brazil, though they still face the hassle of environmental licensing. If the government wants to hand a project to the private sector it will hold an auction, granting the concession to the highest bidder, or sometimes the applicant who promises the lowest user charges. But since Lula came to power in 2003 there have been few infrastructure auctions of any kind. In recent years, under heavy lobbying from public ports, the ports regulator stopped granting operating licences to private ports except those intended mainly for the owners’ own cargo. As a result, during a decade in which Brazil became a commodity-exporting powerhouse, its bulk-cargo terminals hardly expanded at all.

(7) At first Lula’s government planned to upgrade Brazil’s infrastructure without private help. In 2007 the president announced a collection of long-mooted public construction projects, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC). Many were intended to give farming and mining regions access to alternative ports. But the results have been disappointing. Two-thirds of the biggest projects are late and over budget. The trans-north-eastern railway is only half-built and its cost has doubled. The route of the east-west integration railway, which would cross Bahia, has still not been settled. The northern stretch of the BR-163, a trunk road built in the 1970s, was waiting so long to be paved that locals started calling it the “endless road”. Most of it is still waiting.

(8) What has got things moving is the prospect of disgrace during the forthcoming big sporting events. Brazil’s terrible airports will be the first thing most foreign football fans see when they arrive for next year’s World Cup. Infraero, the state-owned company that runs them, was meant to be getting them ready for the extra traffic, but it is a byword for incompetence. Between 2007 and 2010 it managed to spend just 800m of the 3 billion reais it was supposed to invest. In desperation, the government last year leased three of the biggest airports to private operators.

(9) That seemed to break a bigger logjam. First more airport auctions were mooted; then, some months later, Ms Rousseff announced that 7,500km of toll roads and 10,000km of railways were to be auctioned too. Earlier this year she picked the biggest fight of her presidency, pushing a ports bill through Congress against lobbying from powerful vested interests. The new law enables private ports once again to handle third-party cargo and allows them to hire their own staff, rather than having to use casual labour from the dockworkers’ unions that have a monopoly in public ports. Ms Rousseff also promised to auction some entirely new projects and to re-tender around 150 contracts in public terminals whose concessions had expired.

(10) Would-be investors in port projects are hanging back because of the high chances of cost overruns and long delays. Two newly built private terminals at Santos that together cost more than 4 billion reais illustrate the risks. Both took years to get off the ground and years more to build. Both were finished earlier this year but remained idle for months. Brasil Terminal Portuário, a private terminal within the public port, is still waiting for the government to dredge its access channel. At Embraport, which is outside the public-port area, union members from Santos blocked road access and boarded any ships that tried to dock. Rather than enforcing the law that allows such terminals to use their own workers, the government summoned the management to Brasília for some arm-twisting. In August Embraport agreed to take the union members “on a trial basis”.

(11) Given such regulatory and execution risks, there are unlikely to be many takers for either rail or port projects as currently conceived, says Bruno Savaris, an infrastructure analyst at Credit Suisse. He predicts that at most a third of the planned investments will be auctioned in the next three years: airports, a few simple port projects and the best toll roads. That is far short of what Brazil needs. The good news, says Mr Savaris, is that the government is at last beginning to understand that it must either reduce the risks for private investors or raise their returns. Private know-how and money will be vital to get Brazil moving again.

(www.economist.com/news/special-report. Adapted)

According to the fourth paragraph, (A) roads are in such - FGV 2014

Inglês - 2023

Read the article and answer the question

The road to hell

(1) Bringing crops from one of the futuristic new farms in Brazil’s central and northern plains to foreign markets means taking a journey back in time. Loaded onto lorries, most are driven almost 2,000km south on narrow, potholed roads to the ports of Santos and Paranaguá. In the 19th and early 20th centuries they were used to bring in immigrants and ship out the coffee grown in the fertile states of São Paulo and Paraná, but now they are overwhelmed. Thanks to a record harvest this year, Brazil became the world’s largest soya producer, overtaking the United States. The queue of lorries waiting to enter Santos sometimes stretched to 40km.

(2) No part of that journey makes sense. Brazil has too few crop silos, so lorries are used for storage as well as transport, causing a crush at ports after harvest. Produce from so far north should probably not be travelling to southern ports at all. Freight by road costs twice as much as by rail and four times as much as by water. Brazilian farmers pay 25% or more of the value of their soya to bring it to port; their competitors in Iowa just 9%. The bottleneck at ports pushes costs higher still. It also puts off customers. In March Sunrise Group, China’s biggest soya trader, cancelled an order for 2m tonnes of Brazilian soya after repeated delays.

(3) All of Brazil’s infrastructure is decrepit. The World Economic Forum ranks it at 114th out of 148 countries. After a spate of railway-building at the turn of the 20th century, and road- and dam-building 50 years later, little was added or even maintained. In the 1980s infrastructure was a casualty of slowing growth and spiralling inflation. Unable to find jobs, engineers emigrated or retrained. Government stopped planning for the long term. According to Contas Abertas, a public-spending watchdog, only a fifth of federal money budgeted for urban transport in the past decade was actually spent. Just 1.5% of Brazil’s GDP goes on infrastructure investment from all sources, both public and private. The long-run global average is 3.8%. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates the total value of Brazil’s infrastructure at 16% of GDP. Other big economies average 71%. To catch up, Brazil would have to triple its annual infrastructure spending for the next 20 years.

(4) Moreover, it may be getting poor value from what little it does invest because so much goes on the wrong things. A cumbersome environmental-licensing process pushes up costs and causes delays. Expensive studies are required before construction on big projects can start and then again at various stages along the way and at the end. Farmers and manufacturers spend heavily on lorries because road transport is their only option. But that is working around the problem, not solving it.

(5) In the 1990s Mr Cardoso’s government privatised state-owned oil, energy and telecoms firms. It allowed private operators to lease terminals in public ports and to build their own new ports. Imports were booming as the economy opened up, so container terminals were a priority. The one at the public port in Bahia’s capital, Salvador, is an example of the transformation wrought by private money and management. Its customers used to rate it Brazil’s worst port, with a draft too shallow for big ships and a quay so short that even smaller vessels had to unload a bit at a time. But in the past decade its operator, Wilson & Sons, spent 260m reais on replacing equipment, lengthening the quay and deepening the draft. Capacity has doubled. Land access will improve, too, once an almost finished expressway opens. Paranaguá is spending 400m reais from its own revenues on replacing outdated equipment, but without private money it cannot expand enough to end the queues to dock. It has drawn up detailed plans to build a new terminal and two new quays, and identified 20 dockside areas that could be leased to new operators, which would bring in 1.6 billion reais of private investment. All that is missing is the federal government’s permission. It hopes to get it next year, but there is no guarantee.

(6) Firms that want to build their own infrastructure, such as mining companies, which need dedicated railways and ports, can generally build at will in Brazil, though they still face the hassle of environmental licensing. If the government wants to hand a project to the private sector it will hold an auction, granting the concession to the highest bidder, or sometimes the applicant who promises the lowest user charges. But since Lula came to power in 2003 there have been few infrastructure auctions of any kind. In recent years, under heavy lobbying from public ports, the ports regulator stopped granting operating licences to private ports except those intended mainly for the owners’ own cargo. As a result, during a decade in which Brazil became a commodity-exporting powerhouse, its bulk-cargo terminals hardly expanded at all.

(7) At first Lula’s government planned to upgrade Brazil’s infrastructure without private help. In 2007 the president announced a collection of long-mooted public construction projects, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC). Many were intended to give farming and mining regions access to alternative ports. But the results have been disappointing. Two-thirds of the biggest projects are late and over budget. The trans-north-eastern railway is only half-built and its cost has doubled. The route of the east-west integration railway, which would cross Bahia, has still not been settled. The northern stretch of the BR-163, a trunk road built in the 1970s, was waiting so long to be paved that locals started calling it the “endless road”. Most of it is still waiting.

(8) What has got things moving is the prospect of disgrace during the forthcoming big sporting events. Brazil’s terrible airports will be the first thing most foreign football fans see when they arrive for next year’s World Cup. Infraero, the state-owned company that runs them, was meant to be getting them ready for the extra traffic, but it is a byword for incompetence. Between 2007 and 2010 it managed to spend just 800m of the 3 billion reais it was supposed to invest. In desperation, the government last year leased three of the biggest airports to private operators.

(9) That seemed to break a bigger logjam. First more airport auctions were mooted; then, some months later, Ms Rousseff announced that 7,500km of toll roads and 10,000km of railways were to be auctioned too. Earlier this year she picked the biggest fight of her presidency, pushing a ports bill through Congress against lobbying from powerful vested interests. The new law enables private ports once again to handle third-party cargo and allows them to hire their own staff, rather than having to use casual labour from the dockworkers’ unions that have a monopoly in public ports. Ms Rousseff also promised to auction some entirely new projects and to re-tender around 150 contracts in public terminals whose concessions had expired.

(10) Would-be investors in port projects are hanging back because of the high chances of cost overruns and long delays. Two newly built private terminals at Santos that together cost more than 4 billion reais illustrate the risks. Both took years to get off the ground and years more to build. Both were finished earlier this year but remained idle for months. Brasil Terminal Portuário, a private terminal within the public port, is still waiting for the government to dredge its access channel. At Embraport, which is outside the public-port area, union members from Santos blocked road access and boarded any ships that tried to dock. Rather than enforcing the law that allows such terminals to use their own workers, the government summoned the management to Brasília for some arm-twisting. In August Embraport agreed to take the union members “on a trial basis”.

(11) Given such regulatory and execution risks, there are unlikely to be many takers for either rail or port projects as currently conceived, says Bruno Savaris, an infrastructure analyst at Credit Suisse. He predicts that at most a third of the planned investments will be auctioned in the next three years: airports, a few simple port projects and the best toll roads. That is far short of what Brazil needs. The good news, says Mr Savaris, is that the government is at last beginning to understand that it must either reduce the risks for private investors or raise their returns. Private know-how and money will be vital to get Brazil moving again.

(www.economist.com/news/special-report. Adapted)

A questão está relacionada ao gráfico e ao texto - FUGV 2014

Geografia - 2023

A questão está relacionada ao gráfico e ao texto apresentados.

Questão 73 - FGV 2014

Desde 2007, os produtos básicos sinalizam uma estabilização no quantum importado, apresentando pequena variação entre as quantidades máxima e mínima em cada ano. Por sua vez, os produtos semimanufaturados, após período de estabilidade, começam a mostrar tendência de crescimento.
Enquanto isso, as quantidades importadas de produtos manufaturados tiveram crescimento contínuo e foram fortemente aceleradas nos dois últimos anos, impulsionadas pela demanda doméstica e pela forte valorização do real.

Os pontos A(3, – 2) e C(–1, 4) do plano cartesiano são - FGV 2014

Matemática - 2023

Os pontos A(3, – 2) e C(–1, 4) do plano cartesiano são vértices de um quadrado ABCD cujas diagonais são AC e BD.

A variação de entalpia de uma reação química pode ser - FATEC 2023

Química - 2023

A variação de entalpia de uma reação química pode ser calculada pela Lei de Hess. Nessa lei a variação de entalpia da reação global corresponde à soma das variações de entalpia das reações sucessivas do processo.

A pirólise do metano é dada pela equação
CH4(g) → C(s) + 2 H2(g) △H = ?

Para calcular a variação de entalpia da pirólise do metano, considere as reações sucessivas (I), (II) e (III) e seus respectivos valores de entalpia.
(I) CH4(g) + 2 O2(g) → CO2(g) + 2 H2O(l)
ΔH = – 890 kJ/mol
(II) C(s) + O22(g) → CO2(g) ΔH = – 393 kJ/mol
(III) H2(g) + 1/2O2(g) → H2O(l) ΔH = – 286 kJ/mol

Analise a imagem e o texto, que ilustram um experimento. - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Analise a imagem e o texto, que ilustram um experimento.

Questão 15 - FGV 2022

1.º passo: colocar uma estaca de 1 metro no chão, ao meiodia, na cidade A.
2.º passo: medir o comprimento da sombra projetada no chão.
3.º passo: repetir os passos 1 e 2 na cidade B, localizada na mesma longitude da cidade A.
4.º passo: medir a distância entre as cidades A e B.
5.º passo: fazer os cálculos.

A termodinâmica adquire um valor paradigmático universal. A - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

A termodinâmica adquire um valor paradigmático universal. A Terra é como uma máquina térmica. Assim, além do reservatório, o funcionamento das máquinas a fogo requer o que se poderia chamar de um “escoadouro”, que não é outra coisa senão a atmosfera terrestre que deve desempenhar o papel de “um poço frio” e de receptáculo do calor transmitido aos motores pela “fonte quente” dos fornos e caldeiras. Mas, ao mesmo tempo em que a máquina a fogo funciona entre esse diferencial de temperaturas, ela trabalha também para reduzir essa diferença.

Alguns países do mundo têm colocado em prática a construção - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Alguns países do mundo têm colocado em prática a construção de uma “grande muralha verde”, que envolve medidas como o reflorestamento, a criação de sistemas agroflorestais, a criação de terraços e o conserto de dunas.

O mapa analisado caracteriza a) um estudo de impacto ambien - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Analise o mapa.

Questão 12 - FGV 2022

Examine o esquema, com medidas que auxiliam no controle de - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Examine o esquema, com medidas que auxiliam no controle de um dado evento.

Questão 11 - FGV 2022

Leia o excerto e examine o mapa. Oito províncias respondem - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Leia o excerto e examine o mapa.
Oito províncias respondem pela produção doméstica de um determinado recurso natural no Brasil, que é encontrado nas bacias do Solimões, Ceará, Potiguar, Sergipe-Alagoas, Recôncavo, Espírito Santo, Campos e Santos. Sua formação geológica remonta à era paleozoica a partir de material mineral acumulado no período Devoniano.

Questão 10 - FGV 2022

O clima mais ameno encontrado na costa Atlântica da Europa, - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

O clima mais ameno encontrado na costa Atlântica da Europa, especialmente nos litorais da Irlanda, da Grã-Bretanha e do sul da Escandinávia,

Nas décadas de 1950 e 1960 houve aumento da razão de - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Nas décadas de 1950 e 1960 houve aumento da razão de dependência, chegando a 90 dependentes para cada 100 pessoas em idade ativa. A partir de 1970, a razão de dependência começa a cair continuamente até chegar ao nível de 50 dependentes para cada 100 indivíduos em idade ativa no período de 2010 a 2030. Esta menor carga de dependência é denominada na literatura de Janela de Oportunidade ou Bônus Demográfico.

As linhas destacadas no mapa correspondem a a) rotas migrat - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Analise o mapa.

Questão 07 - FGV 2022

As superintendências de desenvolvimento regional tinham - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

As superintendências de desenvolvimento regional tinham como objetivo diminuir as desigualdades e promover maior integração do território brasileiro.

A imagem faz referência a) à ocupação de terras abandonadas - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Examine a imagem.

Questão 05 - FGV 2022

Considerando conhecimentos sobre o comércio mundial e saben - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Questão 03 - FGV 2022

A partir do início do século XX, o processo de alienação do - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

A partir do início do século XX, o processo de alienação do trabalho intensificou-se com uma nova organização do processo produtivo,

Quarenta anos depois de algumas reformas, mais de 800 - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2022

Quarenta anos depois de algumas reformas, mais de 800 milhões de pessoas saíram da pobreza, mas, ao mesmo tempo, o coeficiente de Gini subiu 15 pontos entre 1990 e 2015. Essas transformações favoreceram o progresso do setor privado, mas o Estado mantém um controle direto sobre boa parte da economia — o setor público representa por volta de 30% —, um exemplo de capitalismo de Estado.

No que toca ao acórdão condenatório, assinale a afirmativa - FGV 2022

Outras Disciplinas - 2022

No que toca ao acórdão condenatório, assinale a afirmativa correta.

O planeta que está ficando cada vez mais desigual. Nos - FGV 2022

Geografia - 2020

O planeta que está ficando cada vez mais desigual. Nos últimos 40 anos, a concentração de renda só cresceu com a globalização. Tanto é assim que atualmente nenhum país tem maior desigualdade que a África do Sul. O país, por ironia, viu crescer a desigualdade após o fim do Apartheid.

Na oração “— Traduzo coisa nenhuma” (5.o parágrafo), o term - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

A frase do último parágrafo do texto “A maioria, sem dúvida - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

Analisando-se os modos de organização do texto, conclui-se - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

As passagens “— O quê?” (2.o parágrafo) e “professor, quem - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

Modos de xingar

— Biltre!
— O quê?
— Biltre! Sacripanta!
— Traduz isso para português.
— Traduzo coisa nenhuma. Além do mais, charro!
Onagro!
Parei para escutar. As palavras estranhas jorravam do interior de um Ford de bigode. Quem as proferia era um senhor idoso, terno escuro, fisionomia respeitável, alterada pela indignação. Quem as recebia era um garotão de camisa esporte; dentes clarinhos emergindo da floresta capilar, no interior de um fusca. Desses casos de toda hora: o fusca bateu no Ford. Discussão. Bate-boca. O velho usava o repertório de xingamentos de seu tempo e de sua condição: professor, quem sabe? leitor de Camilo Castelo Branco.
Os velhos xingamentos. Pessoas havia que se recusavam a usar o trivial das ruas e botequins, e iam pedir a Rui Barbosa, aos mestres da língua, expressões que castigassem fortemente o adversário. Esse material seleto vinha esmaltar artigos de polêmica (polemizava-se muito nos jornais do começo do século), discursos políticos (nos intervalos do estado de sítio, é lógico) e um pouco os incidentes de calçada. A maioria, sem dúvida, não se empenhava em requintes.

(Carlos Drummond de Andrade. “Modos de xingar”.
As palavras que ninguém diz, 2011.)

Nas frases “E outra que ele come para digerir de novo” e “ - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia a tira Níquel Náusea, de Fernando Gonsales.

Questão 131 - FGV 2020

Nas expressões “cientistas exasperados”, “exemplar da - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

Nos dois primeiros episódios da série Chernobyl, da HBO, cientistas exasperados tentam convencer os superiores na usina e no governo soviético de que um dos reatores nucleares explodiu e está jorrando radioatividade sobre a Europa.
A resposta dos superiores, exemplar da estupidez surrealista de uma burocracia totalitária, é sempre a mesma: impossível, um “reator RBMK não explode”. A posição oficial é que havia somente um pequeno incêndio no telhado.
“Eu fui lá, eu vi!”, repetem os cientistas, um após o outro, antes de vomitarem, verterem sangue pelos poros ou caírem duros. Apenas quando a radioatividade é detectada na Suécia, Mikhail Gorbatchov encara seus ministros com uma expressão de “camarada, deu ruim...” — naquela altura, a radioatividade liberada já era superior à de vinte bombas de Hiroshima.
Só mesmo no totalitarismo soviético, pensei, assistindo à série. Então fui ler na revista Piauí o trecho do livro A Terra inabitável: uma história do futuro, do jornalista David Wallace-Wells, que sairá pela Companhia das Letras no mês que vem. Impossível terminar as 11 páginas sobre o aquecimento global sem ficar apavorado feito um cientista em Chernobyl.

(Antonio Prata. “Bem-vindos a Chernobyl”.
www.folha.uol.com.br, 16.06.2019. Adaptado.)

Considere as passagens do texto: • [...] impossível, um - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

Nos dois primeiros episódios da série Chernobyl, da HBO, cientistas exasperados tentam convencer os superiores na usina e no governo soviético de que um dos reatores nucleares explodiu e está jorrando radioatividade sobre a Europa.
A resposta dos superiores, exemplar da estupidez surrealista de uma burocracia totalitária, é sempre a mesma: impossível, um “reator RBMK não explode”. A posição oficial é que havia somente um pequeno incêndio no telhado.
“Eu fui lá, eu vi!”, repetem os cientistas, um após o outro, antes de vomitarem, verterem sangue pelos poros ou caírem duros. Apenas quando a radioatividade é detectada na Suécia, Mikhail Gorbatchov encara seus ministros com uma expressão de “camarada, deu ruim...” — naquela altura, a radioatividade liberada já era superior à de vinte bombas de Hiroshima.
Só mesmo no totalitarismo soviético, pensei, assistindo à série. Então fui ler na revista Piauí o trecho do livro A Terra inabitável: uma história do futuro, do jornalista David Wallace-Wells, que sairá pela Companhia das Letras no mês que vem. Impossível terminar as 11 páginas sobre o aquecimento global sem ficar apavorado feito um cientista em Chernobyl.

(Antonio Prata. “Bem-vindos a Chernobyl”.
www.folha.uol.com.br, 16.06.2019. Adaptado.)

No texto, a variedade formal da língua, flagrada na - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

Nos dois primeiros episódios da série Chernobyl, da HBO, cientistas exasperados tentam convencer os superiores na usina e no governo soviético de que um dos reatores nucleares explodiu e está jorrando radioatividade sobre a Europa.
A resposta dos superiores, exemplar da estupidez surrealista de uma burocracia totalitária, é sempre a mesma: impossível, um “reator RBMK não explode”. A posição oficial é que havia somente um pequeno incêndio no telhado.
“Eu fui lá, eu vi!”, repetem os cientistas, um após o outro, antes de vomitarem, verterem sangue pelos poros ou caírem duros. Apenas quando a radioatividade é detectada na Suécia, Mikhail Gorbatchov encara seus ministros com uma expressão de “camarada, deu ruim...” — naquela altura, a radioatividade liberada já era superior à de vinte bombas de Hiroshima.
Só mesmo no totalitarismo soviético, pensei, assistindo à série. Então fui ler na revista Piauí o trecho do livro A Terra inabitável: uma história do futuro, do jornalista David Wallace-Wells, que sairá pela Companhia das Letras no mês que vem. Impossível terminar as 11 páginas sobre o aquecimento global sem ficar apavorado feito um cientista em Chernobyl.

(Antonio Prata. “Bem-vindos a Chernobyl”.
www.folha.uol.com.br, 16.06.2019. Adaptado.)

Nas passagens do texto da Exame “focos de incêndio floresta - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia um trecho da letra da canção “Amazônia”, de Roberto Carlos, para responder

Amazônia

A lei do machado
Avalanches de desatinos
Numa ambição desmedida
Absurdos contra os destinos
De tantas fontes de vida
Quanta falta de juízo
Tolices fatais
Quem desmata, mata
Não sabe o que faz
Como dormir e sonhar
Quando a fumaça no ar
Arde nos olhos de quem pode ver
Terríveis sinais, de alerta, desperta
Pra selva viver
Amazônia, insônia do mundo
Amazônia, insônia do mundo

(www.vagalume.com.br)

Os versos “Avalanches de desatinos / Numa ambição desmedida - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia um trecho da letra da canção “Amazônia”, de Roberto Carlos, para responder

Amazônia

A lei do machado
Avalanches de desatinos
Numa ambição desmedida
Absurdos contra os destinos
De tantas fontes de vida
Quanta falta de juízo
Tolices fatais
Quem desmata, mata
Não sabe o que faz
Como dormir e sonhar
Quando a fumaça no ar
Arde nos olhos de quem pode ver
Terríveis sinais, de alerta, desperta
Pra selva viver
Amazônia, insônia do mundo
Amazônia, insônia do mundo

(www.vagalume.com.br)

No período do quarto parágrafo “O que causa estranheza aos - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

Assinale a alternativa que atende à norma-padrão de - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

De acordo com o Dicionário Houaiss, a metonímia é uma - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

Na organização das informações textuais, as expressões - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Na organização das informações textuais, as expressões sublinhadas em “ A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas” (1.o parágrafo) e “Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano” (4.o parágrafo) têm, respectivamente, a função de:

As informações do texto permitem concluir que a) a - FGV 2020

Língua Portuguesa - 2020

Leia o texto para responder

São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

According to the fourth subitem “Effectiveness and elegance - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the fragment from the seventh paragraph “Webb’s mastery - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the specific context of subitem 3 “Delegate but decide”, - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the fragment from the sixth paragraph “NASA itself was, - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the context of the fourth paragraph, the verb “harness” - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

From the reading of subitem 2 “Harness incongruence”, we - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

The fragment from the third paragraph “however valuable the - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

The expression “that deadline”, in the third paragraph, - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Choose the alternative proposing the subtitle that would - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the fragment from the second paragraph “most valuable - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the excerpt from the second paragraph “The U.S. stopped - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the first and second paragraphs the author expresses - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

The expression from the first paragraph “overcome long - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

In the fragment from the first paragraph “It’s no longer - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

The title which best summarizes the content of the text is: - FGV 2020

Inglês - 2020

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Um avião decola da cidade de Nova Iorque (75º O) em direção - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Um avião decola da cidade de Nova Iorque (75º O) em direção à cidade de Berlim (15º L) no dia 13.08.2019, às 14h00. O voo teve duração de 7 horas. Sabendo que os Estados Unidos e a Alemanha estavam no horário de verão, de março a outubro,

A imagem constitui o esboço de uma carta topográfica. - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

A imagem constitui o esboço de uma carta topográfica.

Questão 74 - FGV 2020

A escala, em cartografia, é a proporção entre a área real - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

A escala, em cartografia, é a proporção entre a área real e a área representada no mapa. Há dois tipos de escala: a gráfica, representada a seguir, e a numérica.

Questão 73 - FGV 2020

Com base nas informações do gráfico e em seus conhecimentos - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020


Questão 72 - FGV 2020

O desmatamento de florestas tropicais promove a) a elevação - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

O desmatamento de florestas tropicais

Em 1987, após a Convenção de Viena, foi assinado o - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Em 1987, após a Convenção de Viena, foi assinado o Protocolo de Montreal, um tratado internacional que entrou em vigor em 1o de janeiro de 1989. Atualmente é o único acordo ambiental multilateral cuja adoção é universal: 197 estados assumiram o compromisso ambiental.

A imagem esquematiza o mecanismo a) das ondas, movimentos - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Questão 69 - FGV 2020

Assinale a alternativa que identifica a unidade de relevo - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Questão 68 - FGV 2020

Entre os dias 23 e 28 de março deste ano, a Diretoria de - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Entre os dias 23 e 28 de março deste ano, a Diretoria de Hidrografia e Navegação (DHN) previu e acompanhou a evolução da Tempestade Tropical “Iba”. Primeiro ciclone tropical a ser nomeado segundo a lista estabelecida em 2011, o fenômeno deixou a comunidade marítima em alerta e gerou grande interesse no público em geral.

De acordo com a representação, pode-se afirmar que a) a - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Analise a representação da geração de um sismo.

Questão 66 - FGV 2020

A distribuição dos aglomerados subnormais ocorre, sobretudo - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Questão 65 - FGV 2020

No dia 31.03.2017 foi sancionada a lei que regulamenta a - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

No dia 31.03.2017 foi sancionada a lei que regulamenta a terceirização. Essa lei permite que empresas terceirizem a chamada atividade-fim, áreas principais das empresas, garantindo a prática também na administração pública. Neste caso, terceirizadas ficam autorizadas a subcontratar outras empresas para a execução dos serviços.

A mudança observada na pirâmide etária da China revela que - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Questão 63 - FGV 2020

Hong Kong é uma anomalia histórica. Não só por causa de - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Hong Kong é uma anomalia histórica. Não só por causa de suas ruas dedicadas à monarquia britânica, povoadas de rostos asiáticos, ou suas famosas construções verticais; mas porque Hong Kong é uma Região Administrativa Especial da China, aberta e moderna, apesar de ser controlada pelo regime chinês, um dos países mais poderosos do mundo. As 11 semanas de protestos ilustram o choque entre dois sistemas políticos, um confronto que cresce sob a ameaça de uma intervenção militar de Pequim.

Criado em 1991 pelo Tratado de Assunção, o Mercosul é hoje - FGV 2020

Geografia - 2020

Criado em 1991 pelo Tratado de Assunção, o Mercosul é hoje o terceiro maior bloco do mundo, depois do Nafta (México, Estados Unidos e Canadá) e da União Europeia. Seu PIB total é de US$ 2,8 trilhões (R$ 10,4 trilhões). Se fosse um país, o Mercosul seria a quinta maior economia do mundo, atrás apenas de Estados Unidos, China, Japão e Alemanha.

No apagar das luzes de um governo eleito em 2015 para tirar - FGV 2020

História - 2020

No apagar das luzes de um governo eleito em 2015 para tirar a Argentina do lamaçal econômico [...], a inflação passa dos 50%, o desemprego em 2019 chegou a 10%, a taxa de juros alcança 72% ao ano e a economia em geral, que recuou 2,5% em 2018, deve ir mais para trás ainda neste ano.

Observe o cartaz do documentário Jango, de 1984, dirigido - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Observe o cartaz do documentário Jango, de 1984, dirigido por Sílvio Tendler.

Questão 59 - FGV 2020

O movimento em prol dos direitos civis alcançou o seu - FGV 2020

História - 2020

O movimento em prol dos direitos civis alcançou o seu apogeu entre 1963 e 1965. Em maio de 1963, o centro simbólico do movimento foi Birmingham, Alabama; ali, a polícia empregou uma violência brutal contra os ativistas. Mesmo que a realidade desses fatos já fosse por si mesma escandalosa, foi uma das primeiras vezes que imagens televisivas galvanizaram a opinião em vários países a poucas horas do ocorrido: a imagem da polícia sulista empregando cães e mangueira d’água contra crianças negras era difícil de esquecer.

Com efeito, coexistindo duas regiões dentro de uma mesma - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Com efeito, coexistindo duas regiões dentro de uma mesma economia — integradas pelo mesmo sistema monetário — o salário de subsistência da população tende a ser relativamente mais elevado ali onde é mais baixa a produtividade do homem ocupado na produção de alimentos. A coexistência das duas regiões numa mesma economia tem consequências práticas de grande importância. Assim, o fluxo de mão de obra da região de mais baixa produtividade para a de mais alta tenderá a pressionar sobre o nível de salários desta última, impedindo que os mesmos acompanhem a elevação da produtividade.

Com a vitória do general Francisco Franco na Guerra Civil - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Com a vitória do general Francisco Franco na Guerra Civil espanhola (1936-1939), milhares de refugiados espanhóis procuraram asilo no território francês. Os jornais da extrema direita francesa comentaram a chegada dos republicanos espanhóis.
[...] na extrema direita, a publicação do Partido Social Francês, Le Petit Journal, [afirma] que “a derrocada dos marxistas espanhóis” impõe a proteção do território. “O exército do crime está na França. O que você fará a respeito?” é a manchete do semanário antissemita Gringoire. No dia 8 de fevereiro, o jornal literário Candide tocou o alarme: “Toda a escória, toda a gentalha de Barcelona, todos os assassinos, os comunistas, os carrascos, os profanadores, todos os ladrões, todos os hereges saqueadores, todos os amotinados sem escrúpulos explodiram em nosso solo”. [...] O Action Française, uma “publicação do nacionalismo integral”, pragueja: “A França real não quer servir de depósito para criminosos e assassinos”.

Com a repetição da crise econômica em 1937 e a aproximação - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Com a repetição da crise econômica em 1937 e a aproximação da guerra, não admira que o Estado parecesse melhor preparado do que os empresários para resolver o problema da estagnação e incentivar a rápida industrialização. Quando se verificou ser um erro a reaplicação da teoria do comércio liberal, depois da guerra, os controles foram reassumidos por um governo [...] que se viu também obrigado, por falta de alternativa, a chamar o capital estrangeiro nas condições por ele impostas.

Observe a capa do livro Assim falou Juca Pato, de Belmonte, - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Observe a capa do livro Assim falou Juca Pato, de Belmonte, publicado em primeira edição em 1933.

Questão 54 - FGV 2020

O contrato de trabalho na fazenda de café paulista - FGV 2020

História - 2020

O contrato de trabalho na fazenda de café paulista consistia no pagamento anual de uma certa quantia por cada mil pés de café cuidados [...]. O colono ainda recebia uma quantia estipulada por alqueire (medida) de café colhido. [...] O que tinha uma importância extraordinária no sistema de trabalho nas fazendas paulistas era, entretanto, a possibilidade de plantar produtos de subsistência entre os cafeeiros e a obtenção de um pedaço de terra com essa finalidade, além de um pasto para alguns animais.

[...] no final do século XIX [...] discursos “científicos” - FGV 2020

História - 2020

[...] no final do século XIX [...] discursos “científicos” estabelecem, a partir de características físicas e culturais, uma classificação dos povos e uma desigualdade das raças. [...] Mas são sobretudo as revistas de geografia e de etnografia que influenciam os colonos, ao refletir sobre os melhores métodos para “civilizar nossos negros”. Considera-se, de fato, que os povos que não pertencem à “raça” branca são atrasados, infantilizados.

Leia uma passagem do livro Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Leia uma passagem do livro Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, de Machado de Assis, publicado em primeira edição em 1881. O trecho citado passa-se na década de 1840 e apresenta a voz de um personagem indignado com o momento histórico brasileiro.
Opinava por várias coisas, entre outras, o desenvolvimento do tráfico dos africanos e a expulsão dos ingleses. [...] Que os levasse o diabo os ingleses! Isto não ficava direito sem irem todos eles barra fora. Que é que a Inglaterra podia fazer-nos? Se ele encontrasse algumas pessoas de boa vontade, era obra de uma noite a expulsão de tais godemes1... Graças a Deus, tinha patriotismo.

1 Godemes: neologismo de grande circulação na cultura brasileira do período. Fusão de duas palavras inglesas, “god” (Deus) e “demon” (demônio).

A primeira medida importante tomada pelo PríncipeRegente - FGV 2020

História - 2020

A primeira medida importante tomada pelo Príncipe-Regente após sua chegada foi o Alvará de 1.o de abril de 1808. O propósito fundamental do ato legislativo era promover a industrialização do Brasil. Alguns importantes incentivos foram concedidos por meio do Alvará de 28 de abril de 1809: isenção de imposto de exportação para manufaturados nacionais, uso obrigatório de bens nacionais pelas tropas reais e a distribuição anual de 60 mil cruzados entre os industriais na tecelagem de algodão, lã e seda.

Podem-se apanhar muitos fatos da vida daqueles sertanejos - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Podem-se apanhar muitos fatos da vida daqueles sertanejos dizendo que atravessaram a época do couro. De couro era a porta das cabanas, o rude leito aplicado ao chão duro, e mais tarde a cama para os partos; de couro todas as cordas, a borracha para carregar água, o mocó ou alforge para levar comida, a maca para guardar roupa, a mochila para milhar cavalo, a peia para prendê-lo em viagem, as bainhas de faca, as broacas e surrões, a roupa de entrar no mato, os banguês para curtume ou para apurar sal.

De maneira geral, a conquista progrediu com mais rapidez e - FGV 2020

História - 2020

De maneira geral, a conquista progrediu com mais rapidez e mostrou-se mais eficiente contra os Estados indígenas organizados, uma vez que estes se renderam aos espanhóis como entidades unificadas. Quando caía uma capital urbana, todo o território imperial perdia muito do seu poder de resistência.

Por volta do final do século XVI, teve início uma - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Por volta do final do século XVI, teve início uma transformação profunda no gênero de vida das classes privilegiadas. Os castelos deixaram de ser fortalezas e se tornaram residências de lazer no campo. Seus fossos foram cobertos e suas torres transformaram-se em ornamentos. As famílias ricas tinham, além disso, solares na cidade, onde passavam uma parte do ano. Os divertimentos tornaram-se menos guerreiros, o torneio foi substituído pelo carrossel, exercício de habilidades a cavalo, vindo da Itália. O jogo de combate transformouse na esgrima com espada, de origem italiana, modificada na França.

Aqueles que compõem a cidade, tão diferentes entre si por - FGV 2020

História - 2020

Aqueles que compõem a cidade, tão diferentes entre si por suas origens, condições e funções, de certa forma parecem “semelhantes” uns aos outros. Essa similitude funda a unidade da pólis, porque para os gregos somente os semelhantes podem permanecer mutuamente unidos pela Philia, associados a uma mesma comunidade. Todos aqueles que participam do Estado definem-se como Homoioi, semelhantes, depois de maneira mais abstrata, como Isoi, iguais. Essa imagem das relações humanas encontrará no século VI a.C. a sua expressão rigorosa no conceito de isonomia: igual participação de todos os cidadãos no exercício do poder.

O fixismo, o lamarckismo e o darwinismo são formas de - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

O fixismo, o lamarckismo e o darwinismo são formas de pensamento científico que propõem alternativas para a compreensão da existência das inúmeras espécies em nosso planeta, de que forma elas surgiram e como se relacionam com o ambiente.

Em moscas Drosophila melanogaster, a cor dos olhos e o - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

Em moscas Drosophila melanogaster, a cor dos olhos e o comprimento das asas são determinados, respectivamente, pelos genes R e E, conforme a tabela 1.

Questão 44 - FGV 2020

Pedro é afetado por uma doença recessiva ligada ao sexo. - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

Pedro é afetado por uma doença recessiva ligada ao sexo. Ele casou-se com Olívia, cujo irmão era a única pessoa de sua família que tinha a mesma doença de Pedro.

O gás carbônico proveniente das células dos tecidos do - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

O gás carbônico proveniente das células dos tecidos do corpo humano difunde-se para o líquido intersticial e atinge os capilares sanguíneos.

A figura representa uma estrutura em formato helicoidal que - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

A figura representa uma estrutura em formato helicoidal que confere uma importante adaptação a um animal.

Questão 41 - FGV 2019

A figura mostra uma planta cultivada em vaso de vidro - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

A figura mostra uma planta cultivada em vaso de vidro transparente que contém água e todos os nutrientes necessários à sobrevivência do vegetal. O caule e a raiz foram iluminados unilateralmente. Ao longo dos dias, verificou-se o crescimento do caule em direção à luz e da raiz contra a luz.

Questão 40 - FGV 2019

Uma criança nasceu com um defeito em uma de suas valvas - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

Uma criança nasceu com um defeito em uma de suas valvas cardíacas. Essa valva não se fecha por completo durante a sístole cardíaca, o que ocasiona retorno de sangue arterial.

Em um experimento, coletaram-se paramécios de um rio, que - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

Em um experimento, coletaram-se paramécios de um rio, que foram distribuídos em dois frascos, 1 e 2. No frasco 1 foi adicionada água do mar e no frasco 2 foi adicionada água destilada. Monitorou-se a frequência de contrações dos vacúolos pulsáteis dos paramécios de ambos os frascos.

No ciclo de vida das plantas há alternância das gerações de - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

No ciclo de vida das plantas há alternância das gerações de organismos haploides e diploides.

A figura mostra uma técnica biotecnológica de manipulação - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

A figura mostra uma técnica biotecnológica de manipulação de células para a produção de um embrião resultante da fusão entre um óvulo anucleado e o núcleo de uma célula somática.

Questão 36 - FGV 2020

Os seres procariotos são bastante diversificados quanto aos - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

Os seres procariotos são bastante diversificados quanto aos processos bioquímicos de obtenção de energia para a manutenção do metabolismo celular. A equação da reação química a seguir ocorre em alguns procariotos que participam de uma das etapas do ciclo do nitrogênio.

Questão 34 - FGV 2020

A doença é percebida quando a perda de sangue começa a - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

A doença é percebida quando a perda de sangue começa a causar palidez, desânimo, dificuldade de raciocínio, cansaço e fraqueza — por isso o apelido “amarelão”. Esses sintomas prejudicam a capacidade de trabalho e aprendizagem.

A figura mostra onze espécies de lagartos do gênero Anolis - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

A figura mostra onze espécies de lagartos do gênero Anolis encontradas na ilha de Porto Rico. Cada espécie vive em uma região preferencial da vegetação, que é definida pelo tipo e altura das plantas, intensidade de luz solar e umidade, entre outros fatores.

Questão 32 - FGV 2020

Cientistas monitoraram uma população de roedores, - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2020

Cientistas monitoraram uma população de roedores, constituída por poucos indivíduos, que se instalou em uma área com abundância de recursos. O gráfico representa possíveis curvas de crescimento dessa população de roedores ao longo do tempo.

Questão 31 - FGV 2020

A figura mostra a distribuição dos íons Na+ e K+ - FGV 2020

Biologia - 2019

A figura mostra a distribuição dos íons Na+ e K+ na membrana plasmática de um neurônio, mediante estímulo externo, em três diferentes momentos que se sucedem.

Questão 35 - FGV 2020

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